Debunking the European 'Free-Rider' Narrative: How the US Benefits from Europe’s Defence Dependence
- Challenger Research
- Apr 14
- 5 min read
Dr James Reeves, George Mennell
April 14
From centrist political scientists like Ian Bremmer to Presidents Biden and Trump, there is a broad consensus in the United States that Europe takes advantage of the US for their military protection. But how accurate is this claim, which is so often taken for granted as true? The source of the unfairness accusations levied against Europe stems from comparing GDP allocation to defence. However, when including other variables such as US weapon exports, forward deployment, and strategic objectives, the picture becomes murkier than GDP allocation suggests. As this article will demonstrate, the Trump administration is well aware of the strategic benefits of U.S. involvement in Europe. Their push for increased European defence spending stems as much from economic interests and trade deficits as from genuine geopolitical concerns.
If the US wanted to reduce trade deficit with Europe and keep manufacturing in the United States, then a self-reliant European defence would be the worst outcome for them. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2025) reported that European NATO members more than doubled their arms imports between 2015-2019 and 2020-2024, with the U.S. supplying 64% of those imports in the most recent period, compared with 52% in the previous five years. Europe accounted for 35% of U.S. arms exports, overtaking the Middle East. SIPRI went on to state that, despite a push for European arms manufacturing, European NATO states have almost 500 combat aircraft and many other weapons still on order from the USA.
According to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024), of the over $180 billion in defence contracts signed by European NATO countries from February 2022 to September 2024, at least 52% went to European systems and 34% to U.S. systems. That is approximately $62.2 billion dollars of US exports to Europe in two and a half years, or about $25 billion per year. This figure does not include all the maintenance and labour costs for existing military hardware. For instance, the UK’s RAF spends around £2.4 billion on maintenance each year, which includes 34 American F-35s. The RAF plan for a total of 138 such aircraft, vastly increasing revenue for US companies. The image below (Jennings 2024) shows the scale of European orders of US-made F-35 variants. This is just for aircraft. The US sell parts for all defence industries, generating recurring revenue for US manufacturing.

Given the rhetoric coming from some in the US about Europe taking advantage of them, you would expect many orders of magnitude above the $25 billion (low end) made back in US weapons sales. This is not the case. Altogether, the estimated direct US expenses on defence in Europe reached $35.8 billion in 2018 according to IISS 2017 projections. Just 5.6% of their total budget. Though troop deployments have increased in Europe to around 80,000 vs 67,000 pre 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, $35.8 billion will not be far off current total US spend in Europe per year.
Remember, this money is not for Europe to spend on its defence. The money is nearly exclusively used to pay for US service personnel wages as well as equipment owned and operated by the US. If the United States were to withdraw all forces from Europe, the troops and equipment that the money paid for would return to the US. Furthermore, these forces are deployed close to Russia, a key geopolitical adversary, in countries that would bear the brunt of casualties and costs if a war were to occur.
To further demonstrate the primacy of US economic interests, we can look at the 5% GDP that Trump demands Europe should spend on defence (despite paying under 3.4% themselves). The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) created a report on the ability of Europe to hit a 5% spend on defence proposed by the US. Increasing military spending to 3-5% of GDP could help provide economic stimulus for the large nations like Germany, France and the UK. However, if the additional spending goes to US firms (as both the Biden and Trump administrations have called for), the domestic stimulus effects of increased European military spending would be subdued (PIEE 2025). A lower GDP would reduce overall long-term defence expenditure and vital defence infrastructure investments, thus being counterproductive for long-term European autonomy. Yet, the US continue to push for their own weapon sales over domestic production all the same.
If past and present US policy stances suggest that financial gain drives US policy towards European defence, the current administration all but confirmed it. A report from Reuters on April 2nd shows the true cause behind the push to bring European spending up to between 3 and 5%. Five sources reported to Reuters that US officials told European allies to keep buying American-made arms, amid recent moves by the European Union to limit US manufacturers' participation in the European ReArm Europe plan.
The US want to have their cake and eat it. They want to tell voters that Europe should wholly be responsible for its own defence spending, while simultaneously trying to push Europeans into staying dependent on US weapon imports. Imports which can be halted in times of crisis or can block shipments of European weapons that have American parts. This was demonstrated recently, when the US stated its intent to use end-use agreements to block the sale of Saab Gripen jets to Colombia. The highly praised Swedish jet can be blocked solely because of its use of the General Electric F414 engine. Such blocks usually occur for national security. But in this case, it appears to be in retaliation for Colombia rejecting an offer from President Trump in 2018 for 18 F-16C/D fighter jets. An offer that was upped to 24 jets to try and sweeten the deal. This is just one example of the United States restricting access to predominantly European-made weapons under the guise of national security.
What often seems to escape discourse on this subject is that the strategic goals of the US and Europe are different. Europe wants only to confine a $2 trillion economy Russia to its own borders, whilst the US desires to project power across both the Atlantic and Pacific. The apples-to-apples comparison of European and US GDP spend therefore neglects mission statements. It can be argued that Europe matching the US on defence spending would be a challenge to American leverage over Europe and its position as a global military superpower.
Though the US is correct that Europe should spend more on its own defence to become militarily autonomous, we push back against the US political consensus that the US is being taken advantage of in Europe. The US claim to be a concerned ally pushing Europe to defend itself. The political reality is one of a transactional United States pushing Europe to spend more on American exports.
References
Hendrix CS. (2025) Trump's Five Percent Doctrine and NATO Defense Spending, Feb5. PIIE. Available at: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/trumps-five-percent-doctrine-and-nato-defense-spending.
Jennings G. (2024) Analysis – Lightning strikes: F-35 continues to storm Europe, Feb 7. Janes. Available at: https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/defence/analysis-lightning-strikes-f-35-continues-to-storm-europe.
Schreer B. (2024) Europe’s defence procurement since 2022: a reassessment, Oct 23. IISS. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/10/europes-defence-procurement-since-2022-a-reassessment/.
SIPRI. (2025) Ukraine the world’s biggest arms importer; United States’ dominance of global arms exports grows as Russian exports continue to fall, Mar 10. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Slattery G, Irish J, Psaledakis D. (2025) US officials object to European push to buy weapons locally, Apr 2. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/us-officials-object-european-push-buy-weapons-locally-2025-04-02/.
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