Blaming NATO, Excusing Putin: Debunking the Provocation Myth

Dr. James Reeves, George Mennell

May 19, 2025

“Getting Ukraine to join NATO was the key to inciting war with Russia... The invasion was no surprise to the Biden administration. They knew that would happen. That was the point of the exercise.” – Tucker Carlson (2022)

“We ignored the advice of George Kennan in the 1990s in bringing NATO right up to Russia’s door... It was absolutely a red line for the Russians” – David Sacks (2023)

The quotes above illustrate a popular myth amongst influential right-wing thinkers in the United States. This myth describes how Putin was forced to invade Ukraine. Why, for the inexcusable desire for Ukraine to seek the safety of NATO membership. No official NATO entry offer was made, and nations such as France and Germany were against Ukrainian membership so that Putin could not use Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO as casus belli for invasion. Nevertheless, this provocation argument still surfaces, ignoring all the evidence to the contrary, both from decisions made by Russia since the invasion began, as well as Putin’s own rhetoric prior to/during the 2022 war in Ukraine. 

The influencers spreading the provocation myth have large followings and even roles in Trump's government. David Sacks serves as the White House AI and Cryptocurrency Czar in President Donald Trump's administration, a role he assumed in December 2024. In this capacity, Sacks is responsible for shaping U.S. policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and cryptocurrencies, aiming to position the country as a global leader in these sectors.

As of March 12, Tucker Carlson had approximately 15.96 million followers on Twitter, while David Sacks has about 1.3 million followers. Both also host very popular podcasts that reach millions of people every month. Tucker Carlson holds no official role, but is a close confidant of the President, and one of the most prominent voices for the Trump administration.

The influence even just these two men carry means that their framing of the war in Ukraine has consequences. Support on the right for Ukraine is at a concerning low. As of March 2025, a Gallup poll (Brenan 2025) reported that 82% of Democrats and 52% of independents support Ukraine in winning back its lost territory – compared to just 22% of Republicans. Words carry weight. The anchoring bias – relying heavily on the first piece of information given on a topic – can mean that the NATO provocation myth may persist in public discourse long after it is falsified. This article outlines the strong evidence disproving the provocation narrative. I write this now, to help limit the damage done in polluting public discourse on the war in Ukraine. This is especially important at a time when Ukraine and Russia have had their first direct talks in years. 

American support for Ukraine is a matter of profound strategic and moral consequence. Citizens have every right to shape the direction of that support, but they deserve more than slogans or partisan spin. They deserve the facts: clear, unvarnished, and rooted in reality. Only then can a democratic people make choices worthy of a free society.

Watch What They Do, Not What They Say

The argument from Sacks and other prominent voices on the right centres around game-theoretical concepts from realism and balance-of-threat theory. In a multipolar world, the dominant power (the US) should prevent the formation of a hostile alliance between the next two strongest powers (China and Russia). We have discussed at length previously that Europe is far stronger than Russia in GDP, manpower and innovation terms. It should be noted in irony that Sacks and Carson have nevertheless criticised Europe at length, helping to undermine the NATO alliance between Europe (the real third great power) and the US. To counter their claims, we will focus on what Russia does, not what they say.

Using their model of realism and game theory. They would have to therefore concede two points. 1) If even the threat of Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO was casus belli for an invasion, then it would be rational to do the same to their other bordering neighbour, Finland. 2) If not outright invade Finland, Russia would at the very least bolster defences on the border with that NATO border immediately due to concerns of NATO aggression. Neither of these outcomes occurred. Finland joined NATO in response to the 2022 invasion without a shot being fired. More damning for the NATO aggression argument is in Russia’s response since Finland’s ascension into NATO. 

Only in the past month (April 2025) have Russia finally begun to bolster defences and establish troops close to Finland, with a planned HQ 160 miles from the border. It seems likely that seeing an end in sight in Ukraine, Putin is preparing to strengthen his threat presence for future diplomatic talks with the United States. However, for three years of conflict, Russia’s actions near Finland’s border told a completely different story. 

From the outbreak of the invasion, Finnish aerial photographic evidence suggests Russia pulled significant military hardware from the Finnish border to Ukraine. Finnish broadcaster Yle has analysed satellite images revealing substantial reductions in Russian military presence near Finland's border. At the Petrozavodsk equipment depot, approximately 50 armoured vehicles were removed between June 2023 and May 2024. According to Finnish intelligence sources in June 2024, approximately 80% of the personnel and equipment from Russian bases near the Finnish border have been redeployed to Ukraine. There are numerous OSINF satellite images of previously full sites of vehicles now largely empty. If Putin worried about NATO aggression, leaving their border almost completely defenceless for 3 years of conflict with a “NATO proxy” would be catastrophic. Russia would be leaving themselves vulnerable on a border that is now a NATO member, who can bring to bear a significant force trained for combat in the challenging sub-arctic terrain. Sweden also joined NATO after the outbreak of the war, yet they too have received this double standard from Russia. 

If the United States declared a war on cartels and global drug trafficking, Sacks and Carlson would be very vocal in calling out a decision to reduce military force on the US-Mexico border, because they would rightly see it as counterproductive and strategically foolish. Yet, they both still believe that Russia is threatened by NATO, whilst it leaves swathes of its border more defenceless to NATO members than they were when not bordering NATO. The only cause for such action would be desperation in keeping up the fight in Ukraine. But this would completely contradict their narrative that Russia dominates the battlefield; with it being only a matter of time before Russia defeats Ukraine. Therefore, neither argument is consistent with the American Right’s NATO provocation argument. 

Russia Claims It's the Victim, but Eastern Europe Has Seen This Playbook Before

Soviet Tanks in Prague, 1968. Image Source: Britannica

Ukraine, like many of its neighbours in Eastern Europe, spent generations under the rule of Russian domination that cloaked their suffering in propaganda and disinformation. To understand why countries such as Poland and Baltic states  are among Ukraine’s most fervent supporters today, one need only examine who speaks most forcefully against Putin, who gives the most aid relative to their GDP and who has taken in vast numbers of Ukrainian refugees. The answer is always the same: those who have known Russian oppression masked as retaliation firsthand.

The Baltic nations and Poland in particular are unflinching in their opposition to Russian aggression. They do not need to theorise about what Putin’s vision of a “Russian world” entails, they have lived it. From mass deportations and crushed revolts, their histories are etched with the scars of Russian domination - cultural subjugation, brutal repression, and killings hidden from the world or masked as something else.

I recently returned from Prague, a city that still bears the memory of the 1968 Prague Spring, when Soviet tanks rolled in to crush a brief democratic awakening. The Soviets falsely claimed that Czechoslovak leaders had requested "fraternal assistance" from the Warsaw Pact to stop a supposed Western-backed uprising. Similar tactics were deployed in the 1956 Polish Poznań Uprising, which Russia claimed to be Western-instigated. Today, Czechia is home to over 370,000 Ukrainian refugees and Ukrainian flags hang from public buildings and private balconies alike. During my stay, the Ukrainian flag was as visible as the Czech flag, a symbol not just of solidarity but of shared memory. Hotel TVs had Ukrainian-language channels, as if to say: You are not just visitors - you are part of us now.

The Czechs understand the cruelty of this war with painful clarity. They know what it means to have your future shaped not by your own people, but by the dictates of Moscow. They also know what it means to escape that fate - through EU membership, through NATO and through democratic resilience. But Ukraine, another survivor of Soviet repression, has not been afforded the same geographical fortune. 

Those closest to Russia are the most acutely aware of their geographical predicament. The Czech Republic is at least buffered by Poland and Slovakia. This is not the case for the small Baltic nations. Lithuania has the misfortune of being surrounded by Russian territory, with Kaliningrad to their southwest.

Again, the data speaks for itself when fearing Russian aggression. The Baltic states all rank in the top 5 supporters of Ukraine as of percentage GDP allocated to Ukraine support, according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker (2025). In fact, Estonia is number 1. If the Baltic states and Poland believed Russia was lashing out because of Ukraine’s NATO hopes, they would not be leading on increased GDP allocations towards their own defence. Rather, they would assume that the war would start and end in Ukraine. This is, of course, ridiculous, and unlike Sacks and Carlson, they do not have the luxury of assigning causes for Putin’s aggression that best fit their own world view. 

The Baltics, Poland and basically all of Europe cite Russia as their reason for ramping up military spending significantly in the past few years. Compare this to Israel and the Middle East & North Africa (MENA). Since Israel's response to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, several Arab nations have increased their defence spending in recent years. However, these increases are stated and predesigned to be driven by regional security concerns (Algeria/Morocco), modernisation efforts (Egypt), strategic priorities (Saudi Arabia and UAE) or some variation of all three. The difference between the MENA and European response to conflict perfectly illustrates the difference between a nation responding to a threat and one that has sought to dominate its neighbours.

What must those in Prague, Riga, Vilnius or Warsaw think when they hear Americans argue that Ukraine should have surrendered its aspirations in the name of “stability”? Likely, they remember that stability under domination is not peace, but submission. And they know better than most that if Ukraine falls, they could be next.

Imperialist Ambitions

In contrast to the popular narrative that NATO expansion provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a closer look at Vladimir Putin’s own words and actions reveals a very different motive—imperial ambition, not defensive strategy. In a televised address on February 21, 2022, just days before launching a full-scale war, Putin made no clear demands to halt NATO’s growth. Instead, he denied Ukraine’s legitimacy as a nation, declaring:

“Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia—more precisely, Bolshevik, Communist Russia... Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood.”

This speech, and others like it, were steeped in imperial nostalgia, evoking a vision of a “Greater Russia” and casting Ukraine not as a neighbour, but as lost territory. The rhetoric was historical revisionism dressed as statecraft—a worldview in which Ukraine, Belarus and even parts of Moldova are rightfully Russian. As Michael Cox wrote in LSE IDEAS (2022), the real target is not simply Ukraine:

“Putin himself has made it only too clear that Russia’s real target is not so much Ukraine - a nation which in his view has never existed anyway - but rather the United States, whom he claims tried to destroy Russia after 1991.”

This belief is echoed by figures close to Putin. Dmitri Volodin, Speaker of the Russian State Duma, described Ukraine as “a colony of the United States…occupied by NATO.” Such views illustrate a paranoid, zero-sum vision of international politics in which the West is an existential threat and smaller states are merely pawns.

Putin does not see Ukraine in isolation; he sees a world divided between great powers, with nations like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova as unclaimed territory in a broader contest between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. In this worldview, anything not yet protected by NATO is a potential opportunity for Russian expansion, not a threat to be deterred.

This imperial mindset is not just theoretical—it’s cultural. At a pro-war rally attended by Putin in March 2022, Russian pop singer Oleg Gazmanov performed a song that encapsulated this revanchist dream. Its lyrics proclaimed:

“Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova, this is my country.”

March 2022 rally where Putin raised support for Russian troops and heard Oleg Gazmanov. Image Source: Rueters.

The true threat, then, is not NATO encroachment but Putin’s belief that these regions belong to a reborn Russian empire. The pattern is clear: Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, Ukraine in 2022—each a step in reclaiming perceived historical lands, not resisting Western encirclement. It is very telling how Putin has projected his own mindset of conquest onto his adversaries. When French President Macron began stating willingness to extend its nuclear umbrella in March, Putin compared Macron to Napoleon, stating that Napoleon failed to conquer Russia also. Putin interprets geopolitics as rulers would prior to the 20th century – every country has a goal of territorial expansion. From this lens, Putin’s hatred of the west makes sense, for he thinks western leaders are hiding behind the same desires for power that motivate authoritarian regimes. 

If anything, NATO is the safety net, not the spark. To argue that Ukraine joining NATO provoked Russia is to mistake the lock for the burglar. Finland’s peaceful accession to NATO in 2023, without retaliation, further exposes the myth that NATO membership inherently endangers Russia.

Putin’s real intentions were so clear that many in the intelligence services knew of the invasion beforehand. Talking on the Rest is Politics podcast, Ex British Head of MI6 Sir Alex Younger realised Russia would invade Ukraine before any ‘exquisite’ intelligence reports. Rather, it was the essay Putin wrote on the destiny of Ukraine and Russia. He argues that this was: “not just Ukraine… but also about the unacceptability of eastern European states, formerly members of the Warsaw Pact… having an independent foreign policy of their own, and a demand they put limits on their own choice... He has been super clear about that. And when he talks about the root causes of the war, that is what he is talking about.” Only the Russian elite and the American right choose to disregard Putin’s own words in favour of NATO provocation narratives. 

Empty Promises 

Part of the provocation narrative is that Ukraine is just a pawn for NATO (mainly US) influence expansion. Ignoring Ukraine’s agency in this decision glosses over Ukraine’s betrayal by the West, when they relinquished their protection from Russia – nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. In an effort to promote global non-proliferation and regional stability, Ukraine agreed to relinquish its nuclear weapons and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In return, it received security assurances through the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994 by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum, the signatories pledged to:

• Respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders.

• Refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity or political independence.

• Avoid economic coercion aimed at subordinating Ukraine’s sovereign decision-making.

  
  

These commitments were not vague diplomatic niceties; they were assurances exchanged for Ukraine’s disarmament. Yet two decades later, Russia flagrantly violated this agreement by annexing Crimea in 2014 and subsequently launching a full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukraine would have expected the US and UK to honour the independence of Ukraine’s sovereignty. This has evidently not been the case, with hawk-like Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, indicating that Ukraine should cede some territory to Russia.

These actions not only breached the Budapest Memorandum but also violated international law, most notably Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia is tasked with upholding this charter. Its aggression against Ukraine represents a stark betrayal of that responsibility.

Ukraine’s experience sends a clear message: international agreements and security assurances, in the absence of enforceable commitments, can prove woefully insufficient. To trust in words and promises from those who have already broken them in the path is not credible diplomacy. The lesson drawn is sobering. Only a strong and credible defensive alliance can offer real protection. While recent rhetoric from the Trump administration has cast doubt on the reliability of US commitment to NATO, the presence of the UK and French nuclear deterrents underscores that, even without US leadership, NATO remains Ukraine’s most viable path to lasting security.

The Provocation Myth: Why Blaming NATO Enables Authoritarians

This article has argued that the claim that NATO provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is both intellectually lazy and lacking in credible evidence. The anticipation of aggression does not validate the logic behind the prediction - particularly when it neglects more salient factors. Appeasers once suggested that Hitler would lash out if he felt encircled. He did – but not because he was cornered, rather because he was driven by a vision of imperial revival. The same logic applies to Putin’s war: not as a defensive manoeuvre, but as an expansionist campaign to restore a perceived Russian greatness. Putin believes this Russian empire is Russia’s right and is his key objective to reclaim.

Within this narrative lies something more insidious – a denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty. To argue that a sovereign nation has no right to determine its alliances, or that its wish to defend itself justifies a renewed invasion, reveals a profound moral and ethical failing in the reasoning of figures such as David Sacks and Tucker Carlson. This position suggests that smaller nations must subordinate their agency to the preferences of more powerful states. By that logic, if Britain and Germany were to enter a defensive alliance, it would somehow justify Germany invading – an obviously absurd proposition.

The lessons of the Second World War were meant to establish that sovereign states can chart their own course, provided they act within the bounds of international law. Accepting the arguments of Sacks and Carlson undermines this principle and sets a dangerous precedent – one that risks dragging us back to a 19th-century world order where power alone determines legitimacy.

Allowing this line of thinking to persist will embolden authoritarian states elsewhere. China is watching closely. As American support for Ukraine appears to weaken, Beijing is likely factoring this into its own strategic calculus. Each sign of Western hesitation becomes a data point in their Taiwan planning – and may eventually provide the justification they seek to act.

And yet, while frontline nations stand firmly with Ukraine, some prominent voices in the West suggest that Ukraine invited its fate simply by seeking protection through its aspirations to secure a peaceful future within NATO. The idea that NATO expansion provoked the war is not only factually incorrect, but also morally vacant. Appeasing a nation abducting Ukrainian children and committing countless war crimes on a democratic nation - in the hope that they join you against their closest ally - would be to fall into China and Russia’s trap. Sacks and Carlson’s approach gives Putin and Xi evidence to say: the West are hypocrites, they talk of morality, but they too just care about power and influence. This makes the provocation narrative not just misleading, but dangerously consequential for the West’s moral identity and its implications for future foreign policy with the developing world in particular should not be dismissed.

References 

Brenan M. (2025) Support for Greater U.S. Role in Ukraine Climbs to 46% High, Mar 18. Gallup. Available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/658193/support-greater-role-ukraine-climbs-high.aspx.

Cox M. (2022) “Best and Bosom Friends” Putin, Xi and the Challenge to the West. LSE Ideas. PDF.

Kiel Institute. (2025) Ukraine Support Tracker: A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine, Apr 15. IFW Kiel Institute for The World Economy. Available at: https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/.