Cheap Drones, High Stakes: Countering the Rise of Low-Cost Lethality

Dr J Reeves, G Mennell

April 22

Key Takeaways

· The age of tank battlefield supremacy is over: Russia’s monthly tank losses contrast sharply with production rates, revealing how armour struggles in modern drone-dominated warfare.

· Cheap drones, devastating impact: $500 FPV drones are destroying multi-million-dollar tanks and outpacing conventional weapons in cost efficiency and volume on the battlefield.

· A broken cost equation: Using expensive missile systems to shoot down low-cost drones is unsustainable — militaries urgently need affordable and scalable countermeasures.

· Defences are evolving fast: Systems like the UK’s $0.14-per-shot ‘Rapid Destroyer’ and Sweden’s Loke show how low-cost, high-tech solutions are emerging to meet the drone threat head-on.

NATO countries have dedicated resources into expensive, ‘exquisite’ equipment designs that become part of small strike forces. This design approach made sense when our main objective was to undertake missions against technologically inferior insurgency forces in the Middle East and Africa. However, there are now evident flaws in their ability to fight prolonged wars against similarly advanced opponents. The UK has only 213 Challenger 2 tanks remaining after donating 14 to Ukraine. This is the same number of Russian tanks estimated to be destroyed in December 2024, or 15 days’ worth of tanks in September 2024.

The UKDJ (2025) reported there are no plans to increase this number despite additional military spending which cannot be attributed to just one factor. The UK is far from the front to deploy tanks effectively compared to mainland Europe. However, being overlooked in times of extra funding strongly suggests that the UK have calculated that the cost-benefit analysis for tanks skews heavily away from them in the age of cheap drone warfare.

One must only look at Russian production numbers to understand why. Even when attempting to build tanks as rapidly as possible, it is estimated that only around 80-90 Russian T-90M tanks are completed each year. This is an extremely low figure that does not allow for compensation for losses in the hundreds each month. Of course, sanctioning key parts of Russia’s advanced equipment played a part in this, but in general tanks are far too complex and resource intensive to be easily replaced when lost in such consistently large numbers. And why are the losses so high? Small, cheap drones. Indirectly through visual target recognition for artillery or other weapon systems or directly via dropping bombs based on the carry capacity of the drones, to open or exposed parts of vehicles.

FPV Drones

The inexpensive first-person view (FPV) drone has proved to be one of the most potent weapons in this Russia-Ukraine war.  FPV drones are classified as Class I (mini/micro) drones because of the weight and altitude/range capabilities.  FPVs - originally designed for civilian races - are controlled by pilots on the ground and are often crashed into targets, laden with explosives. They thrive in wars in which neither side has air superiority, since anti-aircraft systems prevent conventional air missions, causing Russia to resort to long-range glide-bomb tactics.

These incredibly low-cost drones have complicated the cost-benefit equation of air defence. While traditional air defence systems can neutralise these threats, using expensive military assets against low-cost consumer technology is an unsustainable economic equation. Reuters report that one such FPV drone, including an explosive warhead secured with cable ties, can cost under $500. This is in stark contrast to MANPADS missiles like the Stinger which cost governments between $480,000 and $1.375 million per unit. 

Class I and II drones fly low with minimal signatures, can operate in swarms and can be autonomous, evading standard detection methods. Conventional air defence systems target traditional aircraft and missiles, not small, slow, unmanned systems. This capability gap requires urgent attention. Counter uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) solutions must evolve rapidly to keep pace with evolving drone technology and maintain effective defence capabilities.

However, as with many things in the West, government procurement seems to cost dramatically more than commercial procurement. For example, according to Chávez and Swed (2024), drones procured in the US DoD Replicator initiative, are approximately five times as expensive as commercial off-the-shelf models. This cost increase is claimed to be due to the military specifications. Ukraine have been far more resourceful, establishing huge FPV drone capabilities. Kamyshin, the previous Ukraine minister of strategic industries, told the Kyiv Independent this month that there “are more than 150 manufacturers in our country. Our capacity is to produce over 5 million FPV units per year”. No one knows what modern warfare requires more than Ukraine. The fact that they have pushed FPV drone production to these levels suggests that they are cost-effective means of fending off larger forces. There are now dozens of videos online of FPV drones dropping their bombs into the open hatch or the exposed parts of BMPs and various Russian main battle tanks like the T-72.

Loitering munitions

Loitering munitions are considered class II drones because of their range, weight and altitude capabilities. Loitering drones are more costly than FPV drones (the Zala lancet costs around $20,000) but have considerably more capabilities. As with class I drones, they can be deployed by a single soldier on the front lines who can control the drone. Some can even operate remotely using AI. Loitering drones can operate in even comms-denied zones providing surveillance. However, where loitering drones really shine is in their search-and-strike capabilities. They are often carrying high explosive munitions and will ‘Kamikaze’ into targets. They can eliminate armoured vehicles, including tanks, and have been seen to attack helicopters. Their small size makes them difficult to see, while their low altitude means they often go undetected by air defence systems.

Russia have developed their own in response to the numerous models the Ukrainians have been using from the West. For example, The ZALA Lancet is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition developed by the Russian company ZALA Aero Group. Ukraine has begun to create their own SETH UAS drones. Some have been delivered for battlefield testing in March of 2025 (see image below). These ‘Kamikaze’ drones operate via direct visual control, rather than pre-programmed GPS coordinates. 

Ukrainian domestic loitering drones are still in their testing phase. Consequently, Ukraine has mostly relied on Western-made drones. The US-made switchblades and Anduril's Altius 600M/700M drones comprise the bulk of the orders. US companies are eager to produce their drones for Europe given the demand for these systems. Anduril is understood to be considering various British sites for a plant making advanced weapons (Hastings 2025), likely to include the Altius drone variants. This could be a prudent move for Anduril given the global trade war uncertainties. However, as we have discussed in earlier newsletters, whether the Trump administration could block US weapons being re-sold to Ukraine is of constant concern for Europe, which they are attempting to address with their own drone programs, like the HX-2 and OSKAR loitering drones from the UK and France respectively.

Ukrainian soldiers holding SETH UAS drones donated by the Come Back Alive charity. Source: Come Back Alive.

One-Way Attack Drones

Russia have also caught onto the new warfare reality. However, Russia has different strategic objectives. While Ukraine focuses on utilising their smaller force to maximise damage to the enemy within their own country, Russia seeks to maximise damage to infrastructure and military (and often civilian) targets. Apart from the glide bomb - with 3,000 bombs dropped in March alone - one-way attack drones have been their most effective tool. Though they are very similar to loitering drones (in Class II), one-way attack drones do not ‘loiter’, or hover around looking for targets but fly straight towards an intended target. These drones can replicate or replace missiles, depending on the drone’s size and capabilities.

At first, Russia relied heavily upon the Iranian Shahed-136/131, before utilising their own new cheaply made models like Gerbera. These drones will often fly ahead of real airstrikes as decoys to use up Ukraine’s air defence missiles, leaving critical targets like energy infrastructure defenceless. Shaheds themselves being larger, have been upgraded with guidance systems and electronic countermeasures, and can carry a 40kg explosive payload. Despite all this capability, the drones are estimated to cost only around $35,000 (CSIS 2025). The rise in these one-way attack drones has been dramatic. The chart below demonstrates the sudden dominance of these drones over any other form of missile. These drones were extremely rare for the first year of the war, before leaping up many magnitudes in late 2024 when production was ramped up.

Combating Cheap Drones

Broadly speaking, countering drones typically involves striking their launch sites or operators using kinetic means such as artillery or rocket fire. If that’s not feasible, drones can be intercepted mid-flight or disabled by jamming their communication links. However, as previously discussed, these defensive measures are often significantly more expensive than the low-cost drones they aim to neutralise.

In response, European companies, working closely with governments, have been developing a range of innovative solutions that address both the mass deployment of drones and their affordability. In any conflict, particularly one involving asymmetric forces, the smaller side must ensure its resources are used more efficiently than its adversary. For Ukraine, this means continuing to produce its own low-cost drones while also developing cost-effective ways to neutralise enemy systems. The following three case studies illustrate how this balance is being pursued.

MARSS Interceptors  

MARSS Group, a Monaco-based company originally known for developing AI-powered security systems for superyachts, was an unlikely contender in the field of drone warfare. Their NiDAR C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aerial System) platform has been designed to address the escalating threat posed by drones—ranging from micro to large tactical models. Tailored for military and security applications, NiDAR dramatically improves the speed and accuracy with which operators can detect, verify, and track aerial threats. Capable of identifying hundreds of objects simultaneously from up to 25km away, the system uses artificial intelligence to autonomously distinguish drones from non-threats, such as birds, significantly reducing false positives and operator burden.

However, MARSS has gone beyond detection alone. The company has developed a full end-to-end C-UAS solution, featuring its own Interceptor-MR drones. These are launched from smart vertical tubes integrated with the NiDAR sensor network and are engineered to collide with and neutralise Class I and II drones from distances of up to 5km. It’s a novel and proactive approach - fusing advanced surveillance with kinetic response. However, costs remain uncertain as its first tests only begun in Q1 2025, according to EDR (2024).

Concept art of MARSS Interceptor-MR drone colliding with an FPV drone. Source: MARSS (2025).

Rapid Destroyer

Another promising European drone killer in development is being tested in the UK. British soldiers have successfully brought down swarms of drones in Wales using a new UK-made radiofrequency weapon, developed by a consortium led by French defence firm Thales. The experimental system, known as a Radiofrequency Directed Energy Weapon (RF DEW), otherwise referred to as ‘Rapid Destroyer’ (see below), uses invisible high-frequency waves to disrupt the internal electronics of airborne threats. During the trials, the Army managed to simultaneously detect, track and neutralise multiple drones in a single engagement. What is remarkable about this system is that each ‘shot’ costs around $0.14.

According to the Ministry of Defence, over 100 drones were neutralised during the series of tests using this new technology. This test marked the largest anti-drone swarm trials that the British have ever conducted.

Radiofrequency weapon, Rapid Destroyer, mounted to a vehicle, Source: UKDJ (2025)

The Saab ‘Loke’: An immediate drone killing solution

In a remarkable display of rapid collaboration unheard of in modern warfare, the Swedish Air Force, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), Saab, and several partners have successfully evaluated Concept "Loke" in just 84 days. This cutting-edge capability represents a major step forward in counter-drone technology, combining detection and neutralisation systems to address the growing threat of hostile unmanned aerial vehicles. Loke comprises two integrated components: one dedicated to drone detection, and the other to elimination.

At the heart of the detection capability is the Giraffe 1X radar system—a permanent, high-performance radar first developed in 2023. Though costly, its advanced automatic tracking function allows for simultaneous surveillance, target acquisition, and early warning. The UK Ministry of Defence was the first to acquire the system, purchasing 11 units for approximately $25 million (approximately £19 mil), according to Army Technology (2023). The inclusion of Giraffe 1X marks Loke as a technologically sophisticated and strategically valuable development in drone defence. Though expensive, these are permanent parts of a military’s arsenal.

What makes Loke cost-effective is the firing mechanisms. The firing element to Loke uses the Trackfire Remote Weapon Station (RWS). Trackfire is installed on various military platforms, including naval vessels like the Combat Boat 90. The system is not the weapon itself, which can be a variety of heavy machine guns and other weapons – ammunition for such weapons being relatively cheap. The Trackfire’s target and sensor data can be shared across platforms or transmitted within a single vehicle or vessel. Dual command capabilities reduce response time and sensor-to-shooter cycles, meaning the system can respond quickly to sudden drone location information. A team can drive the Loke system on readily available vehicles to the front where needed, eliminating drones that are supporting pushes/defences.  

Complete system, including the Giraffe 1X (right), and vehicle with the trackfire remote weapon station mounted (left), Source: Saab (2025).

Whether or not Loke or similar systems can target and eliminate one-way attack drones is yet to be demonstrated on the battlefield, but the urgency for counter-drone technology means Loke will be tested soon enough. Though we shall cover it in another newsletter, a similar story is playing out at sea, with cost-effective ship killing drones being developed to suit different strategic objectives. 

Conclusion: A New Age of Warfare, Defined by Cost and Creativity

Cheap drones have redefined the battlefield, enabling even modest forces to inflict outsized damage with low-cost, high-impact technology. From $500 FPVs disabling main battle tanks to loitering munitions striking deep behind enemy lines, this shift has exposed the limitations of traditional, high-cost military platforms.

Fortunately, Europe are beginning to respond with their own counter-drone creativity. From smart interceptors and loitering counter-drones to ultra-cheap directed energy weapons and advanced radar integration, Europe is rapidly developing systems subduing drone warfare’s asymmetric advantages. The goal is clear: neutralise enemy drones at a cost equal to—or ideally lower than—the cost of the drones themselves.

Victory in modern warfare will no longer rest solely upon industrial capacity—but will likely be achieved by the side that can innovate, adapt, and deploy faster than its adversary.

References

Allison G. (2025a) Britain has ‘no current plans’ to increase tank numbers, Mar 24. UKDJ. Available at: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-has-no-current-plans-to-increase-tank-numbers/.

Allison G. (2025b) British troops ‘shoot down’ swarm of over 100 drones, Apr 17. UKDJ. Available at: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-troops-shoot-down-swarm-of-over-100-drones/.

Chávez K, Swed O. (2024) SMALL DRONES FOR BIG MILITARIES: THE WAY AHEAD, Aug 15. War Room. Available at: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/small-drones/.

CSIS. (2025) Calculating the Cost-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes, Feb 19. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes#:~:text=Most%20of%20these%20one%2Dway,And%20they%20are%20relatively%20cheap.

Fornusek M. (2025) Ukraine has capacity to produce 5 million FPV drones per year, advisor says, Apr 19. Kyiv Independent. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-can-produce-5-million-drones-per-year-advisor-says/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%20150,drones%20were%20produced%2C%20he%20noted.

Hastings R. (2025) Military drone factory planned for UK could create thousands of jobs, Mar 17. The I Paper. Available at: https://inews.co.uk/news/anduril-american-drone-firm-uk-factory-defence-economy-3586267.

Saab. (2025) From concept to impact - Saab and the Swedish Air Force Deploy "Loke”, Mar 17. Available at: https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2025/march/from-concept-to-impact---saab-and-the-swedish-air-force-deploy-loke.

Salerno-Garthwaite A. (2023) Giraffe 1X radar from Saab to be sold to UK, May 3. Army Technology. Available at: https://www.army-technology.com/news/giraffe-1x-radar-from-saab-to-be-sold-to-uk/.

Valpolini P. (2024) WDS 2024 – MARSS Interceptor MR killer-drone close to production, Feb 6. EDS. Available at: https://www.edrmagazine.eu/marss-interceptor-mr-killer-drone-close-to-production.

Zafra M, Hunder M Rao A, Kiyada S. (2024) How drone combat in Ukraine is changing warfare, Mar 26. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.